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Abstract 
We examine how organizations select some routines to be changed, but not others, during 
organizational search. Selection is a critical step that links an exogenous trigger for change, 
change in individual routines, and larger processes of organizational adaptation. Drawing on 
participant observation of an initiative to improve perioperative efficiency in seven Ontario 
hospitals, we find that organizational roles shape selection by influencing both politics and 
frames in organizational search. Roles shape politics by defining the role-specific goals of the 
people who have authority to change a routine. Organizations will not select a routine for 
change unless at least some elites—people with role-based authority—frame the existing 
routine as negatively affecting their role-specific goals. Roles also shape individuals’ frames. 
Because people are only partially exposed to interdependencies between routines in their day-
to-day work, they may not be fully aware of the diverse impact that an existing routine can 
have on their goals. Proponents for change can use strategic framing to focus attention on 
interdependencies between routines to get elites to better see how an existing routine 
negatively affects their goals. They can also change elites’ goals by using strategic framing to 
focus attention on new and broader goals that the change in routine would promote. 
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 Organizational routines are a key mechanism by which organizations can change, 
adapt, and maintain stability over time (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Feldman and Pentland, 
2003; Becker et al., 2005; Pentland et al., 2012). Routines are recognizable, repetitive 
patterns of interdependent action that govern work processes in organizations (Feldman and 
Pentland, 2003). Research over 20 years has articulated a practice perspective on routines, 
theorizing how routines change. This literature shows that the lived experience of an 
organizational routine, including flexibility in how it is used, can be a source of change in the 
routine and thus the organization (e.g., Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003; 
Howard-Grenville, 2005; Pentland and Feldman, 2005; Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 
2011; Salvato and Rerup, 2011). It has developed the idea that individual routines could be 
generative systems, in which the dynamics within a routine could trigger change 
endogenously. In conceptualizing the individual routine as a generative system (Pentland and 
Feldman, 2005), the source of change comes from experience—feedback, observation, and 
trial-and-error—in enacting the routine. 
Change in a routine can also be triggered by an exogenous event. Cacciatori (2012) 
examined challenges experienced in an effort to alter the bidding routine in an engineering 
firm in response to an environmental shift—a change in government contracting procedures. 
Zbaracki and Bergen (2010) examined change in the pricing routine in a manufacturing 
organization in response to an industry shift—a competitor’s move to cut prices. Others have 
similarly explored intentional change with a trigger exogenous to the individual routine 
(Feldman, 2003; Lazaric and Denis, 2005; Reynaud, 2005; Bapuji, Hora, and Saeed, 2012), 
as well as intentional efforts to maintain or replicate routines (Szulanski, 2000; Bruns, 2009; 
D’Adderio, 2014). Researchers outside of the literature on the practice perspective on 
routines have also pointed to diverse triggers that can lead to changes in work and thus in 
routines, including regulatory shifts (Kellogg, 2009) and technological change (Barley, 1986; 
Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano, 2001). 
Researchers who examine exogenously triggered efforts to change routines focus on 
the dynamics of the change process (Feldman, 2003; Bruns, 2009; Zbaracki and Bergen, 
2010; Cacciatori, 2012). They do not consider how the exogenous trigger led to efforts to 
change that particular routine. Missing from this research is the idea that organizations 
accomplish their work through a large number of interdependent routines, which interact in 
complex and often unpredictable ways that make it difficult to identify which routines should 
change to respond to some exogenous trigger. Researchers who studied exogenously 
triggered change in the past have immediately jumped from the trigger to the dynamics of an 
individual routine. Conceivably changes to other routines could have helped the organizations 
respond to exogenous shocks or pressure. Why were these particular routines selected for 
change? Because of the focus on processes within individual routines, we still have limited 
knowledge of the process that links an exogenous trigger with a specific response—some 
routines being selected for change but not others. The selection of routines for change—in 
defining which routines change and why—is a critical determinant of the content and 
direction of organizational change. As a result, knowledge of how routines are selected for 
change is key to understanding the process connecting exogenous triggers for change, change 
in individual routines, and broader processes of organizational change and adaptation. The 
objective of this study is to illuminate this selection process. 
 
Selecting Routines for Change in Organizational Search 
The concept of organizational search offers a potentially useful framework for 
thinking about how an exogenous trigger can generate efforts to change some routines and 
not others. Organizational search is a process by which organizations seek out new ways of 
operating that organization members believe would better allow them to achieve performance 
goals (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 1981). The 
search literature does not focus attention on organizational routines, but as a process by 
which organizations can embrace new ways of doing things—described as organizational 
features, activities, alternatives, or policy choices (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 
2000; Siggelkow, 2002; Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006; Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007; Winter, 
Cattani, and Dorsch, 2007)—theories of organizational search can be extended to explain 
why some routines are selected for change while others are not. If we consider routines as 
organizational features, the literature on search would highlight that the trigger for 
organizational search is not necessarily endogenous to the individual routine. Instead, search 
is oriented to improving performance relating to an organizational goal that in most cases 
could reasonably be linked with a wide range of individual routines (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Goal-directed organizational search can be triggered by performance feedback (e.g., 
performance that is above or below an organization’s target for a specific organizational goal) 
or by the availability of slack resources that give organization members time, money, or 
materials to explore doing things in new ways (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal and March, 
1993; Greve, 2003a). This trigger, exogenous to the individual routine, nevertheless can lead 
to an intentional effort to change a specific routine. We draw on the literature on search to 
understand how. 
Using theories of organizational search to understand exogenously triggered change in 
organizational routines focuses our attention on the selection of which routines to change as a 
critical step that is missing in prior research. Cyert and March (1963: 102) highlighted that a 
theory of search requires “a mechanism (a) for generating alternatives and (b) for choosing 
among those generated.” If we were to use models of organizational search to think about 
how organizational routines might change, it would unfold as follows. Organizational search 
would be triggered either when performance is below an organization’s target or when slack 
resources give an organization the ability to experiment and explore opportunities to better 
meet a goal. In either case, search is oriented toward improving performance relating to an 
organizational goal that is affected by multiple organizational routines (cf. March and Olsen, 
1976; Reynaud, 2005). The search literature highlights that these multiple alternatives are 
interdependent. Extending this insight to think about routines suggests that one routine’s 
impact on the goal depends on how it interacts with other routines. It further suggests that the 
complexity of an organization’s system of interdependent routines would make it hard to 
know which routine would have most impact on the organizational goal that is the focus of 
search. As a result, once triggered, search involves identifying and selecting potential 
changes in individual interdependent routines (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 
1963; Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Greve, 2003b; Sitkin et al., 2011). 
Focusing attention on organizational search as a process by which routines may change 
highlights that the selection of routines for change is a missing step in prior empirical studies 
in the literature on organizational routines that examine exogenously triggered change. For 
example, in examining an effort to change the budgeting routine to better meet the goal of 
building strong communities, Feldman (2003) did not explain why the university housing 
division did not attempt to change other routines that could strengthen residence hall 
communities. Similarly, Cacciatori (2012) did not consider whether there were alternatives to 
altering the bidding routine that could have helped the engineering firm better win 
government contracts. We can even see the selection of routines for change as a missing step 
in research that does not, but could, discuss organizational routines. For example, in different 
studies, Kellogg has considered surgical departments’ efforts to respond to concerns about 
surgical residents’ long working hours and patient safety by making changes in how they do 
handoffs between shifts of residents (Kellogg, 2009), how they allocate “scutwork” (Kellogg, 
2011), and how they change staffing schedules (Kellogg, 2012). A search-based theory of 
change in routines would focus our attention on the question of how each individual hospital 
came to select certain practices or routines for change at the start. 
In this study, we ask how organizations come to select some routines for change and not 
others in the context of organizational search. We focus on the question of selection because 
it is an important but under researched step linking an exogenous trigger with an initiative to 
change a particular routine, and we focus on the influence of organizational roles because 
they help define the work people do and thus the routines they enact—and may seek to 
change. 
 
Potential Impact of Roles on Selection 
In examining the selection of routines for change, prior research on organizational 
roles in shaping coordination, communication, and change provides insight into how roles 
may be important in the process (e.g., Barley, 1986; Abbott, 1988; Wenger, 1998; Golden, 
Dukerich, and Fabian, 2000; Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano, 2001; Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 
2003a, 2003b, 2006; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009). A role is a bundle of expected behaviors 
and responsibilities associated with a social position or formal place in an organization’s 
structure. Among other things, organizational roles can help define the work that people do, 
the identity they embrace, the autonomy and control they have over their work, and their 
authority or influence over others. 
Prior research highlights three ways that roles can be important in shaping 
organizational life that can be important in guiding the selection of routines to change. First, 
researchers have highlighted that roles can be important in defining individuals’ role-based 
authority. Abbott (1988) defined jurisdictional authority as a form of occupational role-based 
authority over decisions and particular types of work. Others have explored how individuals 
in diverse occupational roles negotiate their jurisdictional authority (Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 
2003a; Reay, Golden-Biddle, and Germann, 2006; Huising, 2014), how the support of 
individuals with jurisdictional authority can affect the implementation of new practices 
(Edmondson, Bohmer, and Pisano, 2001; Kellogg, 2011), and how differences in authority 
and status can affect coordination across roles (Bechky, 2003b, 2006; Kellogg, 2009; 
DiBenigno and Kellogg, 2014). A common insight across this work is that roles, in 
structuring who has jurisdictional authority over different tasks and decisions, are critical in 
shaping both how work gets done and how it is changed. 
Second, roles can be important in shaping organizational politics by defining 
individuals’ role-specific goals. Cyert and March (1963: 40) suggested that roles may be 
important in shaping how individuals prioritize goals, noting for example that “for the safety 
engineers [safety] is an important goal most of the time. Other parts of the organization rarely 
even consider it.” Others have since shown that individuals in different roles, or with 
different occupational backgrounds, may prioritize different goals in ways that shape their 
actions (Ocasio and Kim, 1999; Golden, Dukerich, and Fabian, 2000; DiBenigno and 
Kellogg, 2014). 
Third, a long history of work has established the influence of organizational roles, 
particularly occupational roles, on interpretive frames. A frame is an interpretive schema that 
enables individuals to organize and make sense of the complex stimuli of everyday life 
(Benford and Snow, 2000). A wide range of factors can influence frames, including 
contextual features of a situation, an individual’s political ideology or work biography, and 
an individual’s exposure to a multiplicity of messages over time (Benford and Snow, 2000; 
McAdam and Scott, 2005; Kaplan, 2008; Nigam, Huising, and Golden 2014; Giorgi and 
Weber, 2015). Researchers have also consistently shown that interpretive barriers across 
occupations can be a barrier to coordination and knowledge sharing (Dougherty, 1992; 
Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003b; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009; DiBenigno and Kellogg, 2014). 
These interpretive barriers have their roots in differences in work practices that inform 
individuals’ occupation-specific knowledge, as well as differences in expertise, language, and 
identity (Barley, 1990; Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003b; DiBenigno and Kellogg, 2014; 
Loewenstein, 2014). 
Research on routines has also explored the impact of roles in shaping dynamics within 
individual routines. Zbaracki and Bergen (2010) extended Nelson and Winter’s (1982) work 
conceptualizing routines as political truces to show how role-based politics, between 
individuals in sales and marketing roles, shaped competing proposals for how a pricing 
routine should change in a manufacturing firm. Cacciatori (2012) similarly showed how role-
based politics in an engineering firm informed actions that individuals engaged in and the 
artifacts they used to shape change in a firm’s bidding routine. Researchers have also 
considered the impact of roles in shaping people’s interpretive frames of a routine. As 
Feldman and Pentland (2003: 101) noted, “Each participant’s understanding of a routine 
depends on his or her role and point of view.” Subsequent work has explored how 
individuals’ roles can shape their differing interpretive frames of both the nature of an 
individual routine and its outcomes (Feldman, 2004; Turner and Rindova, 2012). 
In this paper we examine how occupational roles affect the selection of routines for 
change, focusing on the importance of roles in defining people’s authority, goals, and 
interpretive frames. The impact of roles on selection is different from their impact on 
dynamics within a single routine because selection takes place in a work system of multiple, 
interdependent routines (Levinthal, 1997). The impact of roles on selection is shaped by the 
interplay between roles and interdependencies between routines in two ways. First, an 
existing routine’s impact on people’s role-specific goal depends on how the existing routine 
interacts with interdependent routines (Cyert and March, 1963; Levinthal, 1997). Second, 
people’s boundedly rational frames of how an existing routine affects their goals will be 
shaped by their partial, role-specific experience with the system of interdependent routines in 
their day-to-day work. 
We draw on participant observation of search processes in seven organizations to 
specify mechanisms by which organizations select routines for change during organizational 
search. The search processes that we observed were off-line, or removed from organizations’ 
day-to-day work (Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000)—involving external facilitators, called 
coaches, meeting with diverse organization members in a series of interviews, meetings, and 
action-planning sessions in Ontario hospitals to hash out specific changes in routines to 
improve perioperative efficiency (i.e., efficiency of the surgical process). Our analysis brings 
to light the powerful influence that organizational roles have in shaping the selection of 
routines for change. 
 
Methods 
Empirical Context 
Our theory-building efforts draw on participant observation of a government initiative 
designed to increase the efficiency of perioperative care, which includes the continuum of 
care before, during, and after surgery. The program, named the “perioperative coaching 
program,” involved a process of facilitated search in which external facilitators (the 
“coaches”) met with a range of individuals involved with perioperative care, which 
incorporates pre-surgical assessment, scheduling surgeries, matching cases with staff and 
resources, anesthetic and surgical care in the operating room (the OR), and post-surgical 
recovery. It represents the full set of production processes for surgical procedures and 
involves the work of surgeons, nurses, anesthetists, and administrators. 
During the visits, coaches facilitated efforts by members of the hospital perioperative 
teams to identify and commit to changes in routines that they believed would advance the 
goal of perioperative efficiency. Ontario’s Ministry of Health created the coaching program 
as part of its initiative to reduce surgical wait times. The program was voluntary and free, 
giving all hospitals in the province the option of requesting a coaching team visit but not 
requiring a coaching visit. The coaches themselves were outsiders to the hospitals being 
coached but insiders to the health care system. Each coaching team was made up of 
physicians, nursing managers, and administrators involved with perioperative care in other 
hospitals in the province. They were unique in that they were not traditional consultants, or 
government inspectors, but “peers” who were invited to play a role in facilitating a process 
that would allow hospitals to improve performance (Sherrard, Trypuc, and Hudson, 2009; 
Nigam, Huising, and Golden, 2014). Each visit involved 1½ to 2 days of interviews and focus 
groups with stakeholders in the perioperative program followed by 1½ to 2 days of action 
planning, in which diverse stakeholders prioritized problems and goals and committed to 
steps that they would undertake—involving change in routines—to improve efficiency. We 
complemented our observational data with analysis of documents produced through the 
individual hospital coaching visits; these documents concerned the routines that were selected 
for change. 
Our data differ from data typically used in the practice perspective on routines, which 
typically involves observation of an individual routine over an extended time period 
(Feldman, 2000; Howard-Grenville, 2005; Rerup and Feldman, 2011). Instead, we observed 
search processes across multiple organizations over a relatively short time period. Our 
empirical data are well suited for developing theory focused on how organizations come to 
select routines for change during organizational search for three reasons. First, the coaching 
visits were clearly examples of goal-directed organizational search. All of the hospitals 
voluntarily requested the coaching visit to identify new ways of organizing that would 
increase performance relating to the goal of efficiency. Second, the trigger for change was 
external to individual routines. Hospitals requested a coaching visit as a way to respond to 
increased institutional pressure to improve their efficiency. This institutional pressure 
typically operated in conjunction with performance feedback that led key organizational 
actors to perceive that they were not meeting efficiency goals (e.g., in each hospital we 
regularly heard comments that efficiency could be improved). In all cases, the goal of 
increased perioperative efficiency was potentially shaped by a large number of routines 
involved with delivering perioperative care. Third, the coaching visits involved selecting 
routines for change. The program was designed to help organizations make choices about 
which routines to change by helping them identify routines that might inhibit efficiency, 
select a handful of problems worth addressing, and commit to new routines. 
 
Data and Analysis 
Our research draws on observation by the first author (“the observer”) of seven 
coaching team visits. His observation involved participation in a conference call between 
coaching team members and hospital staff prior to the facilitation visit, observation of 
activities formally scheduled as part of the coaches’ visit, and informal socializing and 
conversations among coaching team members. The observer was able to use a laptop to type 
field notes in real time during most of his observation time, allowing him to gather rich field 
notes with direct quotations and close paraphrases of much of what was said. The excerpts 
presented below are quoted directly from our field notes, corrected for grammar and spelling. 
Our first phase of coding and analysis was exploratory and inductive, involving 
narrative analysis of each coaching visit (Strauss, 1987; Langley, 1999). We analyzed our 
field notes by breaking down each visit into units—representing each formal meeting in the 
coaching visit or time segment of informal interaction—and coding each segment to identify 
what happened during the search process that may have influenced how routines were 
selected and which routines were selected for change. Based on this, we constructed narrative 
summaries for each visit that focused on when and how issues were raised and by whom, 
how issues were talked about or framed, who supported making specific changes in routines 
to resolve problems raised, and whether the engagement with the issue over the course of the 
coaching visit resulted in a specific commitment to change a routine. It was through this first 
round of analysis that we came to focus on the importance of roles in shaping selection and 
the importance of framing. We found that roles influenced how individuals framed problems 
and solutions and the political dynamics that unfolded during search, ultimately shaping 
selection. 
In our second phase of analysis, we returned to the field notes to identify specific 
cases of proposed changes in routines articulated during the coaching visits. Given our 
interest in explaining selection, we looked for proposed changes that were selected as change 
commitments and proposed changes that were not selected. We focused on one broad 
activity—routines governing the use of the operating room (OR)—for more systematic 
analysis. This broad activity involved routines for allocating OR time, scheduling specific 
types of cases to locations or times, or determining what types of cases can be performed in 
the OR at all. We focused on routines governing the use of OR resources for three reasons. 
First, this activity was an important focus of all seven coaching visits that we observed. 
Routines governing the use of OR resources catalyze all other activities in the surgical 
process because they affect the allocation of expensive health care resources: surgeons, 
nurses, and surgical space. As a result, these routines directly address the issue of how the 
perioperative process could be made more efficient. Second, given our emerging focus on the 
importance of organizational roles from our earlier analysis, we focused on this activity 
because it involved multiple organizational roles. Surgeons, anesthetists, administrators, and 
nurses in all seven hospitals identified problems with routines for determining the use of OR 
resources. Third, there was variation in the outcomes of proposed changes in routines 
governing the use of the OR—some were selected as change commitments while others were 
not. This variation gave us a good empirical basis for developing theory to explain selection. 
We identified six routines relating to the use of the OR: (1) routines allocating 
surgical blocks—segments of regularly occurring OR time during which a surgeon operates 
on patients, (2) routines scheduling surgical blocks across a week, (3) routines for booking 
surgical cases within a surgical block, (4) routines for treating urgent or emergency surgical 
cases after regularly scheduled hours, (5) routines for treating urgent surgical cases during 
regularly scheduled hours, and (6) routines for treating minimally invasive procedures outside 
of the OR. Across the seven hospitals we observed 25 cases in which one of the six routines 
described above was discussed as a possible change commitment. Table 1 describes the seven 
hospitals included in our analysis (by their pseudonyms), each of the 25 proposed changes in 
routines, indicated by a unique case number, and whether the routine was selected for change.  
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
To analyze the search process for each of the 25 cases described in table 1, we 
compiled and coded all information related to each case. We coded who came to focus 
attention on a problem, how they framed it as linked with the current organizational routine, 
whether and how individuals framed a proposed change in the existing routine, who initially 
expressed support for or opposition to proposed changes, and whether and how people’s 
frames changed. We also coded our field notes and project documents to determine whether a 
proposed change was or was not selected as an organizational change commitment. 
As we iteratively compared and contrasted our codes across our 25 cases, we 
uncovered a few key findings that formed the core of our account of the selection of routines 
for change. First, we found that the selection of routines for change was ultimately a political 
process shaped by who had role-based authority to change a routine. Routines were selected 
for change only if at least some of the people with jurisdictional authority to make decisions 
to change the routine—always including some surgeons or anesthetists—supported change. 
Second, we found that people’s support for change was significantly driven by the goals that 
they focused attention on as important to performance during the coaching visit, and by 
whether they framed the existing routine as a problem in achieving these priority goals. 
Third, it became clear that individuals’ initial frames of whether an existing routine was a 
problem that hampered performance were boundedly rational in a way that was role-specific. 
People’s frames were shaped by the work that they did, which was significantly defined by 
their occupational roles. Fourth, we observed that strategic framing by initial proponents for 
change, often including the perioperative coaches, could get more people to frame an existing 
routine as a problem and hence could build additional support for change. Fifth, the members 
of the coaching team, based on their experience and overall perspective of the organization, 
could create big-picture frames (e.g., frames that integrated diverse perspectives from within 
the organization) that could challenge role-specific frames. These frames better approximated 
the routine’s impact on organizational members’ goals than the role-specific, parochial 
frames of organizational insiders. 
Building on these findings, we then recoded our data for each of our 25 embedded 
cases to develop and empirically assess our ultimate model of selection. We collaboratively 
coded each case for the five themes that emerged through our analysis and the specific 
concepts (e.g., elites, elites’ initial frames, impact on elites’ initial goals, strategic framing to 
focus attention on interdependencies, etc.) described in the presentation of our findings. 
Because our data are on the “off-line” search process, we do not have direct observations 
from daily practice on how, for example, one routine affects either another routine or role-
specific goals. By observing the search process, however, we were able to collect detailed 
accounts, grounded in different roles, of how a given routine might affect various 
organizational goals. This allowed us to triangulate among perspectives. We identified 
people’s role-specific goals by what was explicitly articulated as important in the search 
process, by the absence of explicit attention to some goals, and based on attributions by 
people in other roles. We used our collaborative discussion of our individual coding to come 
to an informed judgment. We validated our judgments of a routine’s impact on people’s role-
specific goals with members of the coaching team who, in their private interactions, regularly 
discussed the interdependence of routines and how change in one routine might ripple 
through to other routines to affect diverse goals. They often engaged in these discussions 
based on their experience in their own hospitals and with the aid of hospital documents, such 
as the OR schedule, the list of cases done recently after hours, or the nurse staffing schedule. 
This increased our confidence about the implications that changes in one routine had for 
related routines and that the big-picture frame more accurately represented the implications of 
a change than any individual organizational members’ frames. Nevertheless, we necessarily 
exercised judgment in analyzing and coding the cases and engaged in collaborative 
discussion to ensure our interpretations were empirically grounded. 
 
Findings 
Influence of Elites 
The search process was a political process shaped by the extent to which elites—
people who occupied roles that gave them authority to make decisions about a routine—
supported change. Because who has authority can differ across routines (e.g., obstetricians, 
nursing managers, and anesthetists for one routine vs. surgeons for another), the set of elites 
is specific to a given routine. The elites’ goals and their frames of how changes to a routine 
would affect their goals shaped the search process and which routines were selected to be 
changed, although their initial goals and frames could be influenced by strategic framing 
during search. 
Elites’ initial frames were the perceptions they brought to the search process of 
whether and how a routine affected their goals. They were a critical determinant of their early 
support for selection. Elites supported selecting a routine for change if they considered the 
existing routine to have a negative effect on their goals. Because individuals in multiple roles 
often shared authority over a routine, different elites prioritized different goals and had 
different initial frames. Changes to a routine could influence elites’ goals either directly or 
indirectly by creating ripple effects in related routines. Elites’ initial frames were bounded by 
their role-specific knowledge. Despite the fact that routines are interdependent and changes in 
one routine will have implications for related routines, elites often did not see or understand 
these connections and ripple effects. They had narrow, only partial experience with the 
organization’s system of interdependent routines in their day-to-day work. In some cases, 
because of their only partial exposure to interdependencies between routines, elites could not 
see that a routine negatively affected their goals, even if others in the organization could. 
In contrast to elites’ initial frames, which tended to have a narrow and partial view of 
routines and their interdependences, an existing routine’s direct and indirect impact on elites’ 
initial goals could be captured by a big-picture frame that integrated the viewpoints of diverse 
organization members. In our research setting, the coaches (the external facilitators) were 
able to draw on their conversations with a range of people to develop a big-picture frame, 
approximating the routine’s true impact on elites’ initial goals. 
In some cases, people who did not have authority to select a routine for change were 
able to use strategic framing to turn at least some elites’ initial opposition to selection into 
support. These non-elite proponents for change used two strategic framing tactics. First, and 
most commonly, proponents used strategic framing to focus attention on interdependencies. 
Because elites were only partially exposed to the organization’s system of interdependent 
routines in their day-to-day work, they often were not able to see the full impact of an 
existing routine on their goals. Strategic framing that focused elites’ attention on 
interdependencies could get them to better see how the existing routine, in conjunction with 
interdependent routines, prevented elites from achieving their goals. When successful, this 
tactic brought elites’ final frames closer to the coaches’ big-picture frame of the routine’s 
impact on elites’ initial goals, turning at least some elites’ opposition into support. 
More rarely, proponents for selection used strategic framing to focus attention on new 
goals. In the two cases in which this happened, the new goals were broad goals widely valued 
in the setting (e.g., patient care quality), though not always salient in the discussion of 
individual routines. In making new, widely valued goals salient, proponents got elites to 
focus attention on these broad goals and to frame the existing routine as a barrier to achieving 
them. A routine’s impact on elites’ final goals reflects elites’ big-picture frames, informed by 
their discussion of the issue with people in a range of roles, of the impact of the existing 
routine on their revised goals. In turning at least some elites’ initial opposition into support, 
or failing to do so, these strategic framing tactics shaped the selection of routines for change. 
We present the data in two parts. First, we show that with elite support (i.e. support of 
people who have authority to make decisions about an individual routine), organizations 
selected routines for change when at least some elites saw a link between change in an 
existing routine and improved performance in achieving their goals. Organizations rejected 
proposed changes in routines when no elites framed change as advancing their goals. We 
observe 12 cases (cases 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 20, 25) in which elites, depending on 
a quick assessment of the implications of change on their goals, either accepted or rejected 
proposals that a routine be selected for change without strategic framing. These cases 
demonstrate the important role of elites in the search process. The consent of at least some 
elites determines whether a routine is selected. These cases also demonstrate the political 
nature of the search process. Elites give consent, allowing a routine to be selected for change, 
when they view it as advancing their goals. Second, we show how non-elites can influence 
which routines are selected for change by using one of two strategic framing tactics. In eight 
cases (cases 1, 6, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24), non-elite proponents for change were able to 
gain at least some elites’ support for selection by focusing elites’ attention on the 
interdependence between routines in a way that brings their initial role-specific frame closer 
to the big-picture frame of the routine’s impact on their goals. In cases 15 and 16, non-elites 
attempted to strategically frame changes but failed to win the consent of the elites. We also 
observed two cases (cases 2 and 19) in which strategic framing generated elite consent by 
focusing elites’ attention on new goals. 
 
Importance of Elites’ Frames and Goals in the Search Process 
Elites’ frames of whether a routine had a negative impact on goals that they cared 
about determined whether it was selected for change through organizational search. In all 
cases, the routines selected for change had the consent of at least some elites who shared 
decision-making authority over a routine. Routines that were considered during the search 
process but not selected were rejected by all or most elites. For example, members of the 
perioperative team discussed the possibility of moving caesarean procedures out of the OR at 
Lake Hospital (case 11). In this case, obstetricians, anesthetists, and the nursing manager for 
obstetrics (OB) were elites, sharing collective authority to make changes in the routine. 
Obstetricians and anesthetists had clinical authority to perform caesarean deliveries. The 
nursing manager, with the obstetricians and anesthetists, shared authority to decide whether 
or not the routine changed because she managed all training and staffing of the nurses who 
would support caesarean procedures. The obstetricians and anesthetists had been in favor of 
this change for some time but were blocked because the previous nursing manager for 
obstetrics opposed the change. In a discussion about high caesarean rates, the new nursing 
manager signaled her support for a change, commenting, “I come from a hospital where all 
sections are done in the OB department. It’s a model I’m more comfortable with.” Because 
the new nursing manager supported the change along with other elites, the routine was 
selected for change. More broadly, elites consented to selecting a routine for change when 
they framed the change as having the potential to help them fulfil their goals. 
In contrast, elites rejected changes when they judged that change would not advance 
their goals. For example, surgeons have an interest in maximizing the number of surgeries 
they can fit into their OR block. In most hospitals, doing more surgeries increases surgeons’ 
incomes and enhances their ability to treat their patients in a timely manner. As a result, in 
many hospitals, surgeons want the autonomy to book which surgeries and how many 
surgeries they perform during their block. Their goal is maximizing throughput within their 
block. At Lake (case 12), surgeons had the authority to book their own blocks, and because 
they (to varying degrees) prioritized the goal of throughput, they booked tightly, providing a 
low estimate of how much time each surgery would take. As a result, their scheduled blocks 
often ran longer than expected. The OR manager described the current routine, some of its 
impacts, and her assessments of the surgeons’ goals in response to the coaches asking how 
cases were booked: 
OR manager: [Cases are booked based on] assigned times of surgeons. 
[Coaches laugh out loud.] 
Coach 1: Who assigns the times? 
OR manager: The surgeons assign it. 
Coach 2: That is going the way of the dodo bird . . . . 
Coach 1: It has to be demoralizing to the nurses to know they’re working a room that 
always runs late. 
OR manager: They are always the same people [who run late]. 
Coach 2: It’s always [identifies surgeon]. 
OR manager: OH MY GOD!!! He is an offender and does not want any of his time 
touched! . . . I think they want as many cases in as possible for fear that they will be 
poor. . . . I don’t think some are aware of the turnover time. . . . They want their time! 
In addition to the OR manager, other administrators—including the director of perioperative 
care and the vice president of clinical care—framed a link between the existing booking 
routine and problems in achieving various goals that were important to administrators and 
nurses. They highlighted that tight booking caused blocks to run over and incurred overtime 
staffing costs, preventing nursing managers from meeting their budgeting goals. They also 
emphasized that when shifts consistently ran over, tight booking could create burnout among 
nursing staff, affecting nurses’ work–life balance goals and potentially administrators’ goals 
for retaining nursing staff. In contrast, when the coaches asked, surgeons consistently framed 
the existing routine as well-functioning and then changed the subject to focus attention on a 
different issue, unrelated to booking, that they saw as a truly pressing problem. As a result, 
despite the fact that changing the existing routine could increase efficiency and solve 
problems experienced by nurses and administrators, the routine was not selected for change. 
Although elites determined the outcome of the search process, interactions among 
elites and non-elites during search had the potential to influence elites’ consent. The 
discussion of surgical block allocation at Eagle (case 10) provides an example of how non-
elites could have influenced some elites to select this routine for change but did not because 
they failed to see an opportunity for strategic framing. At Eagle, a small rural hospital, 
collectively the general surgeon and four anesthetists had the authority to change the block 
allocation routine. In practice, however, the surgeon decided how to allocate blocks, claiming 
five full OR blocks a week. This required that the anesthetists have a regular presence in the 
OR for a range of procedures. The surgeon prioritized the goal of safety and preferred to do 
even minor surgeries with the resources and support of the OR. The chief of staff described 
the surgeon as “incredibly anxious. . . . He believes every patient has an angry family and a 
lawyer.” Beyond safety, the surgeon prioritized throughput as a goal and wanted to maintain 
control over the functioning of the OR. This was evident in his disregard for the surgical 
services committee that was technically responsible for scheduling. One of the coaches 
highlighted this, noting, “I can say why [the committee is not effective]. Because it is not in 
the surgeon’s interest to have it work. He has the run of the whole OR.” 
The surgeon’s practice of claiming five full days of OR time was inefficient and 
inconvenient for everyone in the organization but the surgeon. Because of its interdependence 
with other routines, including staffing routines for nursing care in the OR, the block 
allocation routine created downstream problems for both administrators and nurses. In 
addition to the general surgeon, visiting specialist surgeons also practiced at Eagle. As a 
result, there were a number of days when the OR nurses were unnecessarily stretched thin 
working with two surgical schedules, i.e., one slate for the visiting specialist and one for the 
general surgeon. The existing block allocation routine also negatively affected the 
anesthetists who prioritized the goal of limiting the time they spend in the OR. Anesthetists at 
Eagle were primary care physicians with additional training in anesthesia. As a result, they 
had to balance the demands of being in the OR with their need for time in their community-
based primary care practices. Commenting that they “would be happy not being here [in the 
OR] till six each night,” the chief of anesthesia described the challenges that members of his 
group faced in balancing their dual responsibilities. At the same time, they prioritized 
maintaining collegiality with the general surgeon. As the anesthesia chief described it, “We 
are a one room school and have to keep everybody happy.” Nevertheless, anesthetists never 
directly framed a link between the existing block allocation routine and their own challenges 
in limiting their time in the OR or spending more time devoted to their community practices. 
Hence their initial frames were not supportive of change. 
Given that the anesthetists were not realizing their goals yet shared authority as elites 
to change the routine, they could have been convinced during search to push for change in the 
block allocation routine. This might have been possible if the nurses and administrators, for 
example, got anesthetists to frame the connection between the block allocation routine and 
the anesthetists’ routines for staffing and managing their primary care practices. This would 
not have convinced the surgeon, but as we discuss further below, routines could be selected 
for change in cases in which conflict among elites leads to mixed support for selection. 
Though the anesthetists preferred to limit their time responsibilities in the OR in order to 
devote time to their community practices, it is not clear if their lack of attention to the block 
allocation routine reflects that they were unaware of the effect of block allocation on their 
goals or that they placed a higher priority on the goal of maintaining collegiality. In either 
case, the anesthetists’ frames of the impact of the block allocation routine on their goals did 
not change. As a result, their final frame remained unsupportive of change. 
It is unclear why non-elites, nurses, and administrators at Eagle did not attempt to 
influence anesthetists’ frames of how the existing block allocation routine had a negative 
impact on their goals. In two of 11 cases in our study in which elites’ final frames uniformly 
did not link the existing routine with problems in achieving their goals, including the block 
allocation routine at Eagle discussed above, the existing routine’s negative impact on elites’ 
initial goals suggests that there was potential for using strategic framing to gain at least some 
elite support. In all 11 cases, elites’ uniform opposition prevented selection. In one case— 
discussion of moving caesarean deliveries out of the OR at Lake—uniform support among 
elites led to the routine being quickly selected for change. These relatively simple cases, in 
which elites’ initial frames were either uniformly favorable or unfavorable for selection and 
did not change during search, highlight the importance of elites’ frames and support for 
change in driving selection. 
 
Strategic Framing Dynamics in the Search Process 
In contrast to the cases described above, we also observed more dynamic search 
processes in which non-elites were able to influence elites’ initial frames and goals. In the 
cases described below, strategic framing in the search process helped build elites’ support for 
proposed changes in existing routines. When elites’ initial frames suggested that they did not 
see a link between the existing routine and problems in achieving their goals, non-elites could 
employ strategic framing either to change elites’ initial frames of the impact of the existing 
routine on their goals or to change elites’ goals. 
To better see how and when strategic framing was effective, it helps to identify 
patterns of elites’ changing frames and goals across cases. Table 2 presents elites’ initial 
frames and the routines’ effect on elites’ initial goals—judged primarily using the big-picture 
frames developed by the coaches—for each of the 24 routines included in our analysis. 
Proposed changes in routines that were not selected for change are shown in bold. To allow 
for cross-case comparisons, we categorized elites’ initial frames as favorable for selection, 
mixed, or unfavorable for selection based on whether elites framed the existing routine as 
negatively affecting their goals. For example, we coded the elites’ initial frames as favorable 
for selection at Lake (case 11), where the nursing manager, obstetricians, and anesthetists all 
initially framed the existing routine of doing caesareans in the OR as negatively affecting 
their goals. At Eagle (case 10), we coded elites’ initial frames as unfavorable for selection 
because neither the surgeon nor the anesthetists framed a link between the existing block 
allocation routine and problems in achieving their goals. If some elites initially framed the 
current routine as a problem that hampered performance and others did not, we coded elites’ 
initial frames as mixed. 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
We coded a routine’s impact on elites’ initial goals as favorable for selection when we 
judged—relying on the coaches’ big-picture frame—that the existing routine negatively 
affected elites’ initial goals. We coded it as unfavorable for selection when we judged that the 
existing routine did not negatively affect elites’ goals or was consistent with their goals. We 
coded it as mixed if the existing routine negatively affected the goals of some elites but not 
others. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 about here] 
Table 3 shows how elites’ initial frames and initial goals changed or did not change 
during search. We present elites’ final frames and the impact on elites’ final goals as either 
favorable for selection, mixed, or unfavorable for selection. As with table 2, proposed 
changes in routines that were not selected as change commitments are shown in bold. We 
underline and italicize the cases in which strategic framing altered either the elites’ frames or 
goals in a way that either transformed uniform opposition into mixed or uniform support or 
transformed mixed support into uniform support. Cases in which elites’ frames changed to 
become more favorable for selection, because at least some elites newly came to frame the 
existing routine as a source of problems in achieving their goals, moved leftward across rows. 
Cases in which elites’ goals changed to become more favorable for selection, because elites 
framed the existing routine as a source of problems in achieving the new goal, moved upward 
and leftward. 
Comparing tables 2 and 3 shows that elites’ initial frames or their initial goals 
changed in at least nine out of 24 cases, resulting in all nine routines being selected for 
change. In these cases, elites initially rejected the selection of these routines for change but 
later in the search process at least some elites consented to these routines being selected. 
Elites’ preferences, and ultimately the selection of routines for change, were influenced by 
the use of strategic framing. Below we show how the dynamics identified across tables 2 and 
3 were accomplished as non-elites crafted frames that drew the attention of elites to the 
interdependencies between routines or altered their goals. 
Strategic framing to focus attention on interdependencies. The most common 
framing tactics involved non-elites attempting to change how elites framed the effects of the 
routine on their goals. They did this by focusing attention on interdependencies between 
routines that elites may not have been aware of to convince them that the current routine 
negatively affected their goals. In cases in which strategic framing to focus attention on 
interdependencies altered elites’ initial frames, getting them to see how the existing routine 
had negative impacts, elites came to support selecting the routine for change. 
Non-elites at Royal (case 21) used strategic framing to change elites’ initial frames 
about the importance of changing the routine for scheduling surgical blocks by focusing 
attention on interdependencies between the block scheduling routine and routines for 
managing access to inpatient hospital beds. This resulted in surgeons and anesthetists coming 
to appreciate how the existing routine exacerbated the problem of surgical cancellations. 
At Royal, surgeons and anesthetists were elites for the block scheduling routine, 
having collective authority to change or maintain the routine through their participation on 
the surgical services committee. Both surgeons and anesthetists prioritized the goal of 
minimizing cancellations on the day of surgery, which happened for scheduled inpatient 
surgeries when there were no available inpatient beds. Minimizing cancellations would give 
surgeons and anesthetists predictability in their ability to use the OR for scheduled cases, 
which would allow them to efficiently allocate their own time to work in the OR and better 
meet the needs of their patients. Both surgeons and anesthetists prioritized minimizing same-
day cancellations as a critical goal, though some surgeons also had a goal of maintaining 
convenience in scheduling. They often had preferences about the day of the week that their 
block was scheduled, which could be driven by the fact that they also had scheduled surgical 
blocks at other hospitals. That said, surgeons and anesthetists were both very clear that 
surgical cancellations was their biggest issue. The chief of orthopedic surgery emphasized 
this during the first meeting in the search process: 
The biggest problem for us is that we don’t have protected surgical beds. We had 
huge cancellations [due to the lack of available inpatient beds]. . . . From a surgical 
perspective and morale, they are pushing us to do joints and do more and then slam 
the brakes on us. It’s a kick in the pants from a morale point of view. 
The current scheduling routine exacerbated the problem of surgical cancellations. On 
some days when multiple surgeons who specialized in inpatient surgeries had their scheduled 
blocks, surgeons would have to cancel surgeries if there were not enough available inpatient 
beds. There were other days on which multiple surgeons specializing in outpatient 
procedures—which did not require inpatient beds—had their scheduled blocks, and available 
inpatient beds could go unused. Hence the impact of the existing routine clearly and 
negatively affected surgeons’ and anesthetists’ priority goal of minimizing cancellations. 
Yet surgeons’ and anesthetists’ initial frames did not link the scheduling routine, bed 
availability, and surgical cancellations. Elites’ inattention to the link between the scheduling 
routine and the problem of cancellations was likely rooted in their lack of direct experience 
with interdependencies between routines in their day-to-day work. Because surgeons work 
within a single OR block, they are not exposed to routines for monitoring the post-surgical 
resource demands across multiple ORs on a given day. Although surgeons seemed unaware 
of a potential link between the scheduling routines and surgical cancellations, they were well 
aware of the effect of the scheduling routine on their own work schedules across their office 
and other hospitals. As a result, they were happy to schedule blocks based on precedent and 
preference. Coordinating the resource demands for surgeries across multiple ORs and the bed 
demands across programs, however, is central to the work of administrators, and they did 
frame the scheduling routine as a source of cancellations. As a result, administrators, 
surgeons, and anesthetists had different initial frames of whether and how the routine for 
scheduling surgical blocks affected their shared goal of avoiding surgical cancellations. 
Non-elites proactively and strategically focused attention on the interdependence 
between the scheduling routine and bed management routines for the elites. When a cross-
functional group of administrators, nurses, surgeons, anesthetists, and external coaches began 
their discussion of the block scheduling routine, both administrators and the coaches used 
strategic framing that focused attention on the link between the scheduling routine and 
surgical cancellations. The OR manager pointed to the possibility of a connection in response 
to a comment by a surgeon that there was variability in surgical cancellations, commenting, 
“But it is Thursday. If it is going to happen any day, it will be Thursday.” One of the coaches 
picked up on her comment: “The OR schedule has more inpatients some days than others. 
You just said if you cancel, it would be on Thursday. Is there an opportunity to even [the] 
flow?” In response, a number of surgeons questioned the feasibility of changing the routine 
and expressed doubts as to whether the block scheduling routine was truly a problem. In the 
midst of the conversation, the director of hospital services drew a direct link between the 
block scheduling routine and cancellations, noting, “It is an issue. There is variability. . . . 
Some days we have 4 [inpatient] cases [scheduled] and some 14. That kind of variability 
causes problems.” 
The administrators’ strategic framing efforts were successful in altering the initial 
frames of some elites. Although a number of surgeons questioned whether changing the block 
scheduling routine was feasible, or truly a cause of surgical cancellations, the chief of 
anesthesia began to recognize a potential link, interjecting, “For example on Monday we have 
ENT [ear, nose, and throat] and plastic surgery. If we can move one of the inpatient services 
to that day instead of the two [which are both day patients], that would even out the flow. It’s 
a little simple step.” The chief of anesthesia’s tentative support was enough to motivate some 
surgeons to speak up in favor of looking at the issue. It was also enough to get the chief of 
surgery to agree to collect data to explore more formally whether the block scheduling 
routine could be modified to minimize surgical cancellations. As a result, there were enough 
elites whose final frames linked the existing scheduling routine with the problem of surgical 
cancellations for the routine to be selected for change. 
Coaches played a key role in focusing attention on interdependencies to build elites’ 
support for changing the routine for treating urgent cases during regularly scheduled hours at 
River Hospital (case 17). At the time of search, River had no routine for accommodating 
urgent surgical cases during scheduled hours. As the chief of surgery described it, “There are 
no open blocks. We tried, but utilization was hit and miss and some people didn’t want to 
adjust their schedule.” As a result, the existing routine involved treating all urgent cases in 
overtime hours, which involved paying nurses 50 percent more per hour. Surgeons, 
anesthetists, and nursing administrators were elites for this routine at River. Together, they 
had the authority to provide nurse staffing and anesthesia coverage for blocks reserved for 
urgent cases (nursing administrators and anesthetists) and to use an open block for urgent 
care to treat urgent cases (surgeons). Interestingly, nobody in the organization saw how 
interdependencies between current routines for handling urgent cases, and other routines—
including routines for staffing the ORs with registered nurses or for regularly doing urgent 
cases after hours—absorbed resources that could be used to expand the amount of OR time. 
By limiting the amount of OR time available, the current routine negatively affected all elites. 
The coaches were able to see the interdependencies between routines and their impact on 
limiting the amount of available OR time. In the absence of any elite support for change, they 
used strategic framing to focus attention on interdependencies between routines to convince 
elites that the current routine was a source of problems. For example, in a mixed group 
including administrators, surgeons, and anesthetists, coaches pointed to slack in the OR 
staffing schedule by highlighting that nurses started an hour before the first OR case at River, 
while they started a half hour before the first case in their own organizations. They went on to 
show that adjusting multiple, interdependent routines could create more OR time: 
Coach 1: If every night you do four hours of urgent cases . . . you can do it in 
[regularly scheduled] day blocks. . . . 
Coach 2: You may need to rejig your nursing staffing . . . but you can take urgent 
cases and work them into your regular day. . . . There are gaps [in the staffing 
schedule when nurses are underutilized]. 
While acknowledging that the current routine prevented the organization from 
expanding the amount of OR time, a few surgeons and anesthetists pointed out that creating 
scheduled urgent time might cause other problems. The chief of surgery then interjected “. . . 
as a group we have to sit down and say where we want to do it [put scheduled time for urgent 
cases]. Open a block in one day . . . a daily block from 4 till 8. . . .” In response, other 
surgeons and anesthetists vocally pledged their support, while the director of perioperative 
care volunteered to be on a task force that would work out details of a solution, resulting in 
the routine being selected for change. 
Strategic framing to focus attention on new goals. Non-elites also built support for 
their preferred changes by encouraging elites to draw a link between a routine and a broad 
organizational goal. To the extent that strategic framing makes salient new goals that elites 
come to prioritize as important, non-elite proponents for change can win elites’ consent, 
though this type of strategic framing was rarer in our data. We observed strategic framing that 
focused elites on adopting broader organizational goals as their own in just two cases—Brew 
(case 2) and River (case 19). In both cases this occurred when non-elites framed changes as 
solutions to problems in achieving broad organizational goals, making new goals salient, and 
at least some elites came to recognize the importance of the organizational goal and became 
motivated to select the routine for change. 
At Brew the director of perioperative care, an administrator, used strategic framing to 
focus attention on the organizational goal of health care quality and related it to the more 
specific goal of developing and maintaining the surgical skills of nurses on the inpatient 
surgical floor and to the routine for scheduling surgical blocks. He proposed modifying the 
scheduling routine in a way that would allow nurses on the inpatient surgical floor to 
primarily treat surgical patients, instead of treating a mix of surgical and internal medicine 
patients as they currently did. Surgeons in this case were elites, with authority to change the 
scheduling routine. Initially surgeons did not frame the existing routine for scheduling 
surgical blocks as a source of problems. As a result, they were not motivated to make changes 
in the scheduling routine to improve skill development. Moreover, because a big-picture view 
would not have identified negative effects on the goals surgeons identified as important (e.g., 
having adequate block time, improving the OR’s physical space), there was limited scope for 
gaining surgeons’ support simply by focusing attention on interdependencies between 
routines. 
The director of perioperative care at Brew focused attention on the goal of improving 
nursing skill development by linking it with the broad organizational goal of health care 
quality, making the quality goal salient. He framed the problem of “[internal] medicine 
patients in our [surgical] beds” by noting that it “is hard to keep the nurses specialized [in 
treating surgical patients] with all of the medical patients” and noted that nurses’ inability to 
specialize could hamper quality. He framed a solution of adjusting the routine for scheduling 
surgical blocks so that surgical inpatients would be on the floor only on weekdays. He could 
then modify staffing routines so that surgical nurses staffed the inpatient floor on weekdays 
and nurses from internal medicine could staff the floor on weekends. In using strategic 
framing that focused attention on the broad goal of quality, the director focused attention on 
interdependencies between routines, emphasizing that changing the scheduling routine would 
allow them to create a situation in which surgical nurses could primarily treat surgical 
patients and hence maintain their specialized skills. Once administrators focused the chief of 
surgery’s attention on these interdependencies, making the broad goal of quality salient to 
surgeons, the chief of surgery came to support changing the routine. 
Efforts by the coaches and administrators to focus attention on the organizational goal 
of addressing community health needs had a dramatic effect at River Hospital. Non-elites at 
River drew a link between the block allocation routine and the goal of meeting community 
health needs. At River, surgeons and dentists were collectively elites, sharing authority to 
allocate blocks through the OR committee. Surgeons and dentists had conflicting initial goals 
that shaped their motivations to change the block allocation routine. Historically, a significant 
proportion of OR time in the hospital went to dentists who had been practicing at community 
hospitals that had since been merged into River. The chief of surgery and other surgeons 
wanted to decrease the amount of time allocated to dentists to increase capacity for their own 
patients, whom they viewed as higher priority than dental patients. The relatively large group 
of dentists did not want to give up their OR time, and the chief of surgery and other surgeons 
did not want to engage in conflict and hence did not publicly identify problems associated 
with the existing routine. 
The coaches, picking up the private concerns raised by the chief of surgery, used 
strategic framing to influence physicians’ perceptions. They framed a link between the block 
allocation routine and the broad organizational goals of meeting community health needs, 
making salient this new goal, which was consistent with some surgeons’ goals of increasing 
time for surgeries that they viewed as more urgent (e.g., cancer surgeries). Rooted in the 
principles of public health, the goal of meeting community health needs was different from 
the goal initially articulated by the chief of surgery, who wanted more time for his own 
higher-priority patients. This broad goal was also presumably valued by dentists and the OR 
committee as a whole. The coaches noted that the provincial government was increasingly 
holding hospitals accountable for defining and achieving strategic priorities that effectively 
met community health needs. They initiated a public discussion of the routine with a mixed 
group of physicians and administrators: 
Coach 1: In the 21st century, hospitals run based on priority programs. It is not like in 
the old days when [medical] departments did what they wanted. . . . Key to the whole 
piece is strategic planning. You have a mandate [from the provincial government] for 
some priority programs. It should be made clear through the whole hospital what 
those priority programs are. . . . What [you need] for the present is to align everything 
with that. Most important is resource allocation. Money should be given to the 
priority programs. . . . Medical staff and nursing should support the priority programs. 
. . . 
Coach 2: This is what informs all decision-making, or needs to. It facilitates decision-
making when looking at OR time. . . . 
The coaches’ introduction of the issue was followed by a debate among physicians, 
the chief of surgery, and the CEO. Two surgeons, for example, spoke up in support of 
collectively revisiting the block allocation routine and proposed collecting and sharing data 
that could be used to better assess the routine: 
Surgeon 1: We need to know what priority programs are and what percentage of 
resources is spent on priority programs. It will be painful for all, but at least we’ll 
have the numbers. 
Surgeon 2: We do not have the information now. We do not know if the OR [block] 
allocation reflects [name of recent strategic plan]. 
In response to the ongoing debate among physicians, one of the coaches encouraged 
physicians to define a collective goal for meeting community health needs and to develop a 
shared understanding of the criteria by which that goal would be assessed: 
Coach 1: A starting point is to ask “what are the block allocations within services and 
what happens in those blocks?” . . . get a sense of how all services are provided in the 
operating room. . . . I talk about the OR because it is an expensive place to do stuff. . . 
. You need clear criteria [for allocating blocks based on community need] and 
everybody to play by the same rules. . . . You need to understand what the criteria are 
. . . and all need to agree that that is the shared vision of care for our community. 
In pushing the physicians to come up with a vision for the care needs of their community, her 
aim was to encourage them to see a relationship between the block allocation routine and a 
collective goal focused on the health needs of the community and to break the pattern of 
basing block allocation on historical use. 
The coaches’ strategic framing efforts began to transform the elites’ goals. Surgeons 
and dentists were still conflicted, and the chair of the OR committee, a dentist, did not 
concede that dentists had too much OR time in the organization. The strategic framing, 
however, made the new overarching goal of meeting community health needs salient. It 
further pushed them to define collectively what meeting community health needs actually 
meant. Because the goal is one that is normatively appropriate in the hospital setting, the 
chair of the OR committee did not openly contest the idea that resources should be allocated 
to best meet community needs. Ultimately, with vocal support from the chief of surgery and 
some individual surgeons, the organization made a commitment to change the routine, despite 
the fact that administrators and the chief of surgery informally said that they anticipated 
changing the routine would be difficult in practice. 
 Search Processes: Patterns in the Selection of Routines for Change 
Our comparative case analysis offers three central findings that allow us to theorize 
about the selection of routines for change and identify patterns of stability and change. First, 
underscoring the political nature of selection, our findings demonstrate that elites’ goals and 
their framing of the connection between changes in routines and their goals determine which 
routines will be selected for change. If a routine does not cause performance problems 
relating to the goals of elites, directly or through interdependent routines, it is unlikely to be 
selected for change. Out of the eight cases in our data in which elites’ initial goals were not 
impeded by a routine, only the one at Brew described above resulted in a change 
commitment. This happened because non-elites were able to focus surgeons’ attention on the 
broad goal of health care quality and show that the existing routine for scheduling surgeries 
caused problems in achieving high-quality nursing care on the inpatient surgical unit. 
Second, our comparative case analysis highlights that elites’ frames of the effects of a 
routine on their goals are parochial compared with a big-picture frame that integrates diverse 
viewpoints. As highlighted in table 2, of the 16 cases in which an existing routine negatively 
affected the goals of all elites or some elites, making change in the routine favorable for at 
least some elites (e.g., for a selection or mixed), elites’ initial frames were less supportive of 
change in ten cases (cases 1, 3, 6, 10, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, and 24). Elites’ role-specific 
exposure to routines, which limits their awareness of interdependencies between routines, 
was an important factor in shaping both elites’ parochial frames and which routines elites 
selected for change. For example, at Royal (case 21), surgeons’ lack of exposure to 
downstream routines for post-anesthesia recovery and admission to inpatient beds, as well as 
their lack of exposure to organization-wide bed-management routines, prevented them from 
seeing how the existing routine for scheduling blocks was contributing to surgical 
cancellations. Overall, our analysis shows that bounded rationality rooted in partial exposure 
to the interdependencies between routines can prevent actors from seeing alternatives that 
would advance their goals. 
Third, our comparative case analysis shows that strategic framing in organizational 
search can be consequential in shaping the search process and which routines are selected. 
Comparing tables 2 and 3, elites’ final frames became more favorable for selection than their 
initial frames in eight of the 24 cases included in our analysis (cases 1, 6, 17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 
and 24) due to strategic framing that focused attention on interdependencies between 
routines. Moreover, as we highlighted above, strategic framing made new goals salient in two 
cases at Brew (case 2) and at River (case 19). 
Changes that resulted from strategic framing mattered in shaping which routines were 
selected for change. In most of the cases that we observed, strategic framing likely played a 
role in removing barriers to change that had inhibited change prior to the search process. Both 
at Royal (case 21, discussed above) and at River (case 18), clinical administrators had 
discussed a longer standing desire to change the scheduling of surgical blocks by day of the 
week to reduce surgical cancellations. At River, a clinical administrator, in talking about her 
desire for change in the routine with the coaches, immediately shifted to talk about barriers, 
observing: 
We know Wednesdays are horrific. . . . Looking at [changing the block schedule] 
sounds easy, but we cannot just say you need to move to a different day. Physicians 
may be working in a different hospital, have a fracture clinic, endoscopy time. It 
impacts lots of other departments. It’s a real conundrum figuring out how to spread 
out [resource demands from surgeries on Wednesdays] more evenly without creating 
another problem. 
Strategic framing by the coaches, and eventually by clinical administrators 
themselves, to focus attention on the causal link between the scheduling routine and surgical 
cancellations likely removed these barriers by directly engaging with and gaining the support 
of elites—in both of these cases, surgeons—for change. 
While our analysis highlights the importance of strategic framing, it also shows that 
the effects of strategic framing are limited. Our coding shows that elites’ final frames were 
less favorable for selection relative to their final goals in four cases (cases 3, 10, 21, and 24). 
For example, at Royal (case 21), the proposal to change the routine for scheduling blocks by 
day of the week had only mixed support among surgeons and anesthetists at the conclusion of 
the search process, despite the fact that surgeons and anesthetists were vocal in stating that 
surgical cancellations were their biggest problem. Our findings on the limits of strategic 
framing are consistent with the idea that bounded rationality is an endemic feature of 
organizational life (March and Simon, 1958) and with research highlighting the challenges of 
communication that can bridge or overcome role-based perspectives and biases in perception 
(Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003b). 
Taken together, our analysis highlights three broad patterns of stability or change in 
organizational routines in organizational search. First, we found cases in which the impact of 
the existing routine on elites’ initial goals, combined with elites’ relatively accurate frames of 
these impacts, led to elites’ relatively uniform opposition or support. In these simple cases, 
discussion of the routine was minimal, and we did not observe changes in elites’ frames. We 
also observed more complicated processes in which the outcome of search was shaped by two 
types of strategic framing. The second pattern involved non-elites using strategic framing to 
alter elites’ frames of how an existing routine affected their goals. This was the primary 
mechanism by which strategic framing led to selection. The third pattern involved the rare 
cases in which non-elites used strategic framing to change elites’ goals. In some of these 
cases, strategic framing to influence frames or goals was able to mobilize elites’ relatively 
uniform support for change. In many cases, strategic framing resulted in routines being 
selected for change through elites’ conflict. Interestingly, in most cases in our data in which 
elites held either conflicting goals or conflicting frames of how an existing routine affected 
their goals by the end of search, the routine was nevertheless selected for change. This was 
the case with discussions of the scheduling routine at Royal (case 21) and the block allocation 
routine at River (case 19) discussed above. 
 
Discussion 
Our aim was to develop theory on the social interactive processes and mechanisms by 
which organizations select routines—or alternative courses of action more broadly—for 
change in response to a triggering phenomenon or event. We identified the selection of 
routines for a change as a key step linking a trigger for change that is exogenous to an 
individual routine with change in any given routine. In doing so, we focused on the 
importance of role-based politics, role-based frames, and strategic framing processes in 
shaping selection. 
By focusing on selection and highlighting the centrality of organizational roles and 
strategic framing in shaping it, we extend research on organizational routines in three ways. 
First, we generate new insight into how role-based politics can shape change in 
organizational routines. Prior research has identified politics as important in shaping routines 
(Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Feldman, 2004; Lazaric and Denis, 2005) and has shown that 
role-based politics can influence the tactics that people draw on to influence change 
(Zbaracki and Bergen, 2010; Cacciatori, 2012). We extend this work by identifying two key 
variables explaining how role-based politics shape selection: jurisdictional authority and role-
specific goals. We show that role-based jurisdictional authority, more than just influencing 
tactics, defines the set of elites with the power to enable or block change in routines. We 
further show that role-specific goals significantly shape which changes elites will support. 
Second, we generate new knowledge of how role-specific frames that cut across 
routines can determine whether routines persist or change. Prior research on routines has 
theorized that people’s understanding of how an individual routine functions—their abstract 
idea of what the routine is and how it works—is important in determining whether and how it 
changes (Feldman, 2000; Feldman and Pentland, 2003). Implicitly, and with some recent 
exceptions (Parmigiani and Howard-Grenville, 2011; Spee, Jarzabkowski, and Smets, 2015), 
researchers have conceptualized the abstract idea of a routine as people’s understanding of 
the entirety of a routine as an analytically distinct unit, set apart from other routines or a 
broader organizational context (cf. Feldman and Pentland, 2003; Pentland and Feldman, 
2005). In contrast, we show that people’s role-specific frames are informed by their day-to-
day work, which both cuts across routines and can involve experience with only part of any 
given routine. This focus on role-specific frames, rather than on people’s abstract idea of a 
routine, allows us to better understand how roles matter in shaping stability or change in the 
context of a system of interdependent routines. 
Third, in examining the role of strategic framing in shaping selection, we show that 
factors other than direct experience can influence people’s understandings of a routine. Prior 
research on routines posits people’s direct experience, which comes from performing a 
routine, as the prime determinant of their understanding of how a routine functions and of its 
effects. In highlighting the role of strategic framing, including strategic framing by the 
coaches, we show how a broader range of influences, such as the vicarious experience of 
others, can influence individuals’ understandings of a routine. 
These extensions to the literature on routines open up new avenues for future 
research. While we underscore the importance of role-based politics, more research is needed 
to fully understand its effects. Because we look at a relatively short window of time, our 
study may exaggerate the power of elites. A longer time frame may give non-elites 
opportunities to acquire new resources or sources of influence that they can draw on to 
achieve change (Bechky, 2003a; Howard-Grenville, 2007; Huising, 2014). Future work can 
more fully explore the power and limits of jurisdictional in shaping the dynamics of stability 
and change within and across routines over time.  
Future work can also explore the effects of both role-specific frames, which 
imperfectly map onto individual routines, and strategic framing. We view our focus on the 
importance of role-specific frames and strategic framing as a complement to rather than a 
replacement for prior research that highlights the importance of abstract understandings of 
individual routines grounded in direct experience. Future research can more fully unpack the 
relationship among the three to develop richer knowledge of how role-specific frames that cut 
across routines, strategic framing by people with and without direct experience working in a 
routine, and abstract understandings of individual routines interrelate and how these 
interrelationships influence stability and change in routines over time. 
Our study extends research on organizational search in three ways. First, we identify 
role-based politics as a source of structural inertia in search. Much contemporary research on 
search focuses on cognitive barriers stemming from people’s bounded rationality as the main 
constraint to performance improvement through organizational search (Levinthal, 1997; 
Gavetti and Levinthal, 2000; Gavetti, 2005). To the extent that the contemporary search 
literature does consider politics as a barrier to performance improvement, it posits either that 
politics and resistance generally are sources of inertia (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Greve, 
1998, 2003b) or that political interests motivate people to filter information (Gavetti, 2005; 
Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2006). We theorize a specific mechanism, driven by how roles shape 
jurisdictional authority, goals, and frames, that can be a source of structural inertia (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1984). In doing so, we add to the relatively limited body of work specifying 
how political barriers can prevent organizations from adopting performance-enhancing 
changes through search. 
Second, we generate new knowledge about how the multiplicity of goals can shape 
processes of organizational search. Despite the fact that the multiplicity of goals is a core 
insight developed in the behavioral theory of the firm, much contemporary research theorizes 
search as a process oriented toward a single goal: performance (Levinthal, 1997; Gavetti and 
Levinthal, 2000). Research that does consider multiple goals has largely focused on the 
determinants, processes, and effects of sequential attention (Ocasio, 1997; Greve, 2003a, 
2008; Gavetti et al., 2012). Complementing this work, we show that elites’ choices to support 
or oppose selecting an alternative for change are driven by their boundedly rational frames of 
how selection would affect their role-specific goals. Moreover, we show that a specific 
change that may advance achievement of one goal can have positive, neutral, or negative 
effects on other goals. Distinct from any objective effects of interdependency, different 
people can have different frames for understanding whether and how the same two goals are 
interdependent. Taken together, our findings show that the multiplicity of goals across roles, 
combined with people’s frames of how routines are interdependent, is central in shaping 
decision making in search. 
Finally, our findings generate new knowledge of what influencing tactics may be 
effective in organizational search. We identify two strategic framing tactics by which 
proponents can build support by either making new goals salient or altering people’s frames 
of how a given alternative will affect the goals they care about. In doing so, we develop 
initial insights into the persuasion tactics that are likely to be effective in gaining support for 
a particular course of action. 
These contributions to the literature on organizational search suggest a number of 
avenues for potential future research. More research can explore the relationship between 
jurisdictional authority over a single routine and dominant coalitions. Cyert and March 
(1963) theorized the dominant coalition as the set of people whose support is critical to the 
functioning of the organization as a whole. They proposed that organizations make trade-offs, 
in the form of resources and policy commitments, across issues and decisions to maintain the 
support of a dominant coalition. Future research can help us better understand whether and 
how elites leverage their jurisdictional authority over a given alternative to advocate for 
stability or change in other domains in which they have less jurisdictional authority. 
Researchers can also more fully explore the effects of different forms of 
interdependence between goals. For example, goals can be independent, complementary, or 
in conflict, and different patterns of interdependence between goals can lead to different 
search processes—i.e., search processes for purely independent goals can be delegated to 
different organizational units or specific occupational groups. Interdependent goals that are in 
conflict can lead to search driven by sequential attention to goals. Additional work, 
potentially using formal models, can also explore the relationship between different patterns 
of interdependence and different search processes and outcomes. 
More work is also needed to understand the range of factors that influence people’s 
perceptions of how goals are interdependent. The multiplicity of goals in organizations is 
well documented and common (Cyert and March, 1963; Greve, 2008; Bidwell, 2010; Gavetti 
et al., 2012). Our findings show that people’s roles influence their understanding of whether 
and how goals interrelate, but this is likely just one of many influences. Future work can 
more fully examine when and how different people adopt different frames of whether and 
how goals interrelate and can explore how these different frames shape their choices in 
organizational search. 
Our hope is that our work will stimulate robust theorizing on the process by which 
organizations select alternatives or courses of action. The literature on routines does not 
theorize how an exogenous trigger is linked to efforts to change or maintain a specific 
routine. Other research, for example research on the changing organization of work, similarly 
jumps from an exogenous trigger, such as a change in laws or a new technology, to specific 
struggles over the redefinition of work roles and practices without theorizing selection 
processes (Barley, 1986, 1990; Kellogg, 2011). Research on search, however, does offer 
insight into which alternatives may be selected. Cyert and March (1963) argued that 
organizations will first select an alternative that is local or similar to current practices or an 
alternative that has been successful in the past. Only later will organizations broaden their 
scope of search to consider either more distant alternatives or alternatives that affect 
vulnerable parts of the organization. Subsequent research, largely using formal models, has 
elaborated on these insights to develop our knowledge of how different types of search can 
lead to different performance outcomes, but it has focused more on the performance impacts 
of different search processes than on enriching our knowledge of the process by which 
alternatives are selected. 
We develop theory to explain how organizations select routines for change in the 
context of organizational search. Our research was inspired, in part, by the rich empirical 
studies in the contemporary literature on organizational routines that take seriously the idea 
that practice—people’s lived experience with their work—is critical in shaping how routines 
persist or change over time. We theorize the selection of routines as alternatives in a context 
with a specific set of features that serve as boundary conditions. The selection processes that 
we observe had specific triggers—the increased salience of the goal of efficiency due to a 
policy shift combined with perceptions within each organization that performance was below 
aspirations relating to the efficiency goal. Our theorizing is also based on a specific type of 
search—a reasonably short process of search that was off-line. Finally, we theorize based on 
a highly professionalized organizational context, in which role-based jurisdictional authority 
may be more relevant and entrenched than in other, less-professionalized contexts. These 
boundary conditions offer a solid base for theorizing. These boundary conditions also 
suggest, however, that ours is just a first step toward developing adequate theory to explain 
how routines, or organizational alternatives more broadly, are selected for change. 
Though we examined problem-driven search that was triggered in part by a policy 
shift, future research can explore how selection processes might differ when triggered by 
technological change. In contrast to a policy shift that was linked very clearly to the single 
goal of efficiency, the link between a technology shift and specific goals can be more 
indeterminate. In addition, while we examined processes of off-line search, work can also 
examine selection in the context of trial-and-error search. Future work could build on the 
initial insights developed in the behavioral theory of the firm and extend it with more fine-
grained theorizing and better unpack how organizations choose between different “local” 
alternatives. Differences in lived experience within organizations, however, can lead to 
differing conceptions of what “local” means (cf. Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011). In some 
ways, all of the proposed changes in routines considered in our research setting were local in 
that somebody knew about each alternative based on his or her prior work, professional 
knowledge, and knowledge of how things were done elsewhere. Despite all being local, some 
alternatives were clearly more selectable than others. In our settings, organizations selected a 
wide range of alternatives so long as at least some elites consented. In trial-and-error 
processes, in which organizations sequentially select a single alternative, the dynamics of 
selection will likely differ. Proponents may differ in their preferences for which local 
alternative should be selected first, while opponents, including non-elite proponents, may 
have more avenues for preventing the selection of what they perceive to be an undesirable 
alternative. Finally, while many research settings are professionalized, future work can also 
nevertheless explore selection in less professionalized settings. In other settings, such as 
project-based organizations or hierarchical corporations, political boundaries and frames can 
be driven less by occupational differences and more by individuals’ idiosyncratic experiences 
or their career histories (Kaplan, 2008; Dokko and Gaba, 2012). 
 
Conclusion 
This paper developed theory to explain how organizations select routines for change, 
with the aim to inspire broader theorizing about processes of selection. More and better cross-
fertilization from research on routines and research on search is a promising route toward 
better theorizing selection. Research on organizational search and on routines both have 
social and intellectual roots in the Carnegie school of organizational research (Cyert and 
March, 1963; Levitt and March, 1988; Gavetti, Levinthal, and Ocasio, 2007; Gavetti et al., 
2012). The two literatures, however, have developed largely independently, with limited 
cross-fertilization. 
Research on organizational routines has developed a rich body of grounded theorizing 
of contextually situated practices. In doing so, it has come to theorize more micro-process 
accounts of evolution, change, and persistence in individual routines. While developing rich 
knowledge of what happens within routines, how they remain stable or change over time, and 
how evolution of routines is informed by people’s work and lived experience, the routines 
literature has become less connected with more organization-level phenomenon. In contrast, 
the search literature has come to focus on more macro-level phenomena relating to 
organization-level goal setting, performance, and adaption. It has advanced our theoretical 
understanding of when and how organizations adapt and change but has become less 
connected with people’s day-to-day work and less grounded in the situated experience of 
organizational life. As a result, accounts of both predictors of search performance and factors 
that shape the search process can feel abstract. Integrating the two creates the potential for 
developing theories of selection and of organizational search more broadly that are connected 
with people’s day-to-day work and grounded in their situated experience. At the same time, 
this integration can reconnect the routines literature with its roots in the Carnegie school, 
allowing us develop a more comprehensive view of the processes and mechanisms 
connecting change in organizational routines with larger processes of organizational 
adaptation and change. 
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